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Abstract 
This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist’s answer to the classical value 
problems of knowledge. According to this solution, knowledge is a better cognitive state than 
what falls short of it —mere true belief or true+Gettierized belief— because when a subject 
knows, she deserves credit for her true belief. The second part of this chapter is devoted to 
showing that this solution cannot be extended to solve the “new” value problem, that is to say, 
the problem of explaining why some higher form of knowledge —what Sosa calls full 
knowledge—is better than some lower form of knowledge—Sosa’s animal knowledge. The 
basic problem for Sosa is that, when a subject fully knows, it is not necessarily the case that she 
deserves more credit than when she has animal knowledge. 
Virtue-Reliabilism and the Classical Value Problems 
Three value problems 
The problem of the value of knowledge results from two solid but unfortunately opposing 
axiological intuitions. On one hand, as observed by Plato in the Meno (97a-d), as far as the 
achievement of our practical goals is concerned, knowledge does not seem more valuable than 
mere true belief. Animals do not need to know that a predator is coming in order to increase 
their chances of survival. A true belief is sufficient to make them run away. Or, to re-use Plato’s 
famous example, having a true belief about the way to Larissa is sufficient to reach Larissa. 
Knowledge seems superfluous. On the other hand, we do value knowledge more than true 
belief. Suppose someone gives you the choice between: 
a. getting knowledge that this plant is toxic or; 
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b. getting a mere true belief that this plant is toxic 
while making clear that there are no special practical costs attached to one or the other of these 
choices. The vast majority of us will prefer knowledge to mere true belief (Pritchard 2009a).1 
At the root of the problem of the value of knowledge lie these two opposite intuitions. 
1. Knowledge does not seem more practically valuable than mere true belief; 
2. But knowledge seems to be more valuable than mere true belief. 
Solving the problem of the value of knowledge requires explaining why knowledge that p is a 
better cognitive state than merely believing truly that p, even though knowing that p and merely 
believing truly that p are on a par as far as their practical value is concerned. More precisely, 
this is required to solve the primary value problem of knowledge (Pritchard 2007, 2009a).  
There is, indeed, a secondary value problem (and even a tertiary value problem). The 
secondary value problem arises from the observation that knowledge is not only better than 
mere true belief. Knowledge is more valuable than any cognitive state that falls short of it. 
Specifically, knowing is also better than holding a Gettierized+true belief, that is to say, than 
holding a justified true belief that falls short of knowledge because it is subject to Gettier 
problems (Pritchard 2007, 2009a).  Here as well, we cannot rely on any additional practical 
value to explain this difference. Knowledge that p is not, presumably,2 more practically 
valuable than the Gettierized+true belief that p. For instance, suppose that I bet that the person 
who will be hired has ten coins in his pocket (Gettier 1963). My holding the Gettierized+true 
belief that the person who will be hired has ten coins in his pocket allows me to win my bet as 
efficiently as my knowing that the person who will be hired has ten coins in his pocket would. 
Solving the secondary value problem requires explaining why it is better to know than to be in 
a state that falls short of knowledge— a Gettierized+true belief. And this must be done even 
though an instance of knowledge and a Gettierized+true belief have the same practical value. 
Making matters even more complicated, knowledge does not simply possess a higher 
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degree of value than, mere true belief and Gettierized+true belief. Knowledge is also valuable 
in a different way. That is, knowledge and true belief do not simply occupy different positions 
on a single evaluative continuum, with knowledge at the top and true belief further down.3 The 
value of knowledge also belongs to a different kind of value. In Pritchard’s words: 
Accounting for the value of knowledge requires us to offer an explanation of why 
knowledge has not just a greater degree, but also a different kind of value than 
whatever falls short of knowledge. Call this the tertiary value problem (Pritchard, 
2009a: 4). 
Solving the tertiary value problem requires explaining why knowledge possesses a different 
kind of value. One elegant way of meeting the challenge raised by the tertiary value problem 
would be showing that knowledge is, in contrast to mere true belief, finally valuable.4 Final 
values are traditionally opposed to mere instrumental values. For an entity to be finally valuable 
is for this entity to be valuable for its own sake. For an entity to be instrumentally valuable is 
for this entity to be valuable for the sake of what it leads to (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen 1999). Morally good actions are generally taken to be finally valuable because they 
seem good for their own sake, they seem to draw their goodness at least partly from what they 
are and not solely from what they lead to. In contrast, drugs, warm baths, and punctual trains 
are merely instrumentally valuable. They draw their value solely from the goodness of their 
effects. It is also possible for certain entities to be both finally and instrumentally valuable. 
Beautiful paintings, for instance, might be said to be both finally valuable in virtue of their 
aesthetic qualities and instrumentally valuable in virtue of the aesthetic pleasure they induce. 
Solving the tertiary value problem by claiming that knowledge is, in contrast to what falls short 
of it, finally valuable requires showing that knowledge is good for its own sake and not merely 
good in virtue of its good outcomes. As we will see below, this is a requirement that virtue-
reliabilism fulfills especially well. 
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Alongside the aforementioned value problems lies the problem of the analysis of 
knowledge. Which property (or properties) turns a mere true belief into an instance of 
knowledge? The value problems and the problem of the analysis of knowledge are intertwined 
because it is a condition on a successful analysis of knowledge that it solves the value 
problem(s).5 Suppose that I defend an analysis of knowledge in which the exemplification of 
some property Π is sufficient to turn a true belief into an instance of knowledge. This means 
that my solution to the value problems will have to be that the exemplification of Π by a true 
belief makes this true belief more valuable than anything that falls short of knowledge. Given 
that knowledge is a cognitive state that is essentially characterized by its superior value, if the 
exemplification of Π by a true belief turns out not to make the true belief more valuable than 
anything that falls short of knowledge, then exemplifying Π cannot be sufficient to turn a true 
belief into an instance of knowledge. Indeed, if exemplifying Π does not make the true belief 
more valuable than anything that falls short of knowledge, I am forced to say that the additional 
value of knowledge results from some other property. And this, of course, is to admit that 
exemplifying Π is not sufficient to turn a true belief into an instance of knowledge. 
This difficulty threatens classical process-reliabilism. According to the classical 
process-reliabilist analysis of knowledge (Goldman 1979), knowledge is true belief that 
causally results from a reliable process (a process that generally produces true beliefs). 
Accordingly, the process-reliabilist solution to the primary value problem must be an 
explanation of why the exemplification, by a true belief, of the property of resulting from a 
reliable process makes this true belief even more valuable. Arguably, this explanation fails. 
This is because the instrumental value that the property of resulting from a reliable process 
should add is swamped by the fact that the belief that results from this reliable process is already 
true (Kvanvig 2003; Zagzebski 2003).6 To explicate, consider two cups of coffee that are 
exactly on a par as far as their tastefulness is concerned but differ as regards the reliability of 
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the processes that produced them. A reliable coffee machine —one that generally produces 
tasty coffee—produced the first cup. The machine that produced the second cup is, in contrast, 
unreliable. However, on this occasion, it produced a tasty coffee, a coffee that is as tasty as the 
first cup, the one produced by the reliable coffee machine. The fact that a reliable coffee 
machine produced the first cup of coffee does not make the first cup better than the second one. 
Any alleged instrumental value that one might be tempted to assign to the first cup of coffee 
because it results from a reliable coffee machine is swamped by the fact that this first cup is 
already tasty. The same reasoning holds with respect to true beliefs. A true belief that is the 
outcome of a reliable process —viz. an instance of knowledge according to process-
reliabilism— does not draw any additional value from its being the result of such a process. 
Any alleged ‘additional’ value is swamped by the fact that the belief is already true. 
The virtue-reliabilist’s solution to the value problems 
One important advantage of the virtue-reliabilist’s7 analysis of knowledge — defended by John 
Greco (2003, 2010, 2012) and Ernest Sosa (2007, 2009a, 2011, 2015)— over process-
reliabilism is its ability to provide an elegant answer to the three value problems above. Before 
presenting the virtue-reliabilist’s solution to the value problems, let me briefly recall what 
knowledge is according to virtue-reliabilism. 
In cases of knowledge, S believes the truth because S’s belief is produced by ability 
(Greco 2012: 1). 
A subject S knows whether p only if S believes the truth regarding p because S 
believes from intellectual virtue (or excellence, or ability) (Greco and Reibsamen 
forthcoming: 1). 
According to Sosa (2007, 2009a, 2015), animal knowledge is apt belief, that is, belief 
whose truth manifests a skill or competence seated in the subject. When a subject’s true 
belief manifests a competence, I will say that this true belief results from her exercising 
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her competence. The virtue-reliabilist’s idea is that this specific relationship is not 
instantiated in the classical Gettier cases (Gettier 1963). In the classical Gettier cases, the 
true belief does not result from the exercise of the subject’s competence. The subject 
arrives at a true belief due to luck. This explains why the subject does not know. 
Let us now consider virtue-reliabilism from the perspective of the value problems. Given 
what they take knowledge to be, the task for virtue-reliabilists is to explain why a true belief 
that results from the exercise of a competence is better than one that does not instantiate this 
property. The virtue-reliabilist’s explanation usually starts with the comparative evaluation of 
two performances. Here is an example of such a comparative evaluation. 
The lucky physician 
A physician examines a patient who suffers from severe stomach pains. Even 
though the physician is not able to give a diagnosis on the basis of this examination, 
she prescribes her patient a medicine that she picks at random from her 
compendium. Now, luckily, this is exactly the drug that her patient needs and the 
patient is healed. 
The competent physician 
A physician examines a patient who suffers from severe stomach pains. After 
having examined her, she arrives at the diagnosis that she suffers from diverticulitis. 
She prescribes her patient the appropriate medicine and the patient is healed. 
Compare the performances of the lucky and the competent physician. Their medical 
performances—the lucky and the competent prescription—are both successful: they both attain 
their constitutive purposes.8 Both cause the patient’s recovery. Their being successful makes 
them both valuable performances. But, virtue-reliabilists insist, we value the competent 
performance even more than the lucky performance. Causing the recovery of a patient is a better 
performance when this recovery is not a lucky outcome but results from the exercise of some 
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medical competence. The competent performance possesses an additional value that the lucky 
performance does not possess. Moreover, what is true of physicians’ successful performances 
is true of successful performances in general. And, so: 
A subject S’s successful performance is even more valuable when it is not due to luck 
but results from the exercise of S’s competence. 
The idea is sometimes expressed in terms of what is creditable to the subject (assuming that a 
successful performance that results from the exercise of a subject S’s competence is creditable 
to S). A subject S’s successful performance is even more valuable when it is not due to luck but 
is creditable to S.9 
When a successful performance—e.g. a medical cure, an accurate shot in archery, a 
winning chess move—is creditable to a subject, this performance displays two values. The first 
value is simply the value that a performance possesses when it achieves its purpose, that is, 
when it is successful. Its additional value is what I have called its credit value (Meylan 2013). 
It is the value that a successful performance possesses when it is creditable to a subject and is 
not a lucky outcome. 
I have said that the upholders of virtue-reliabilism owe us an explanation. Why is a true 
belief that results from the exercise of a competence better than a true belief that does not 
instantiate this property? Such an explanation follows directly. 
Regarding the value of knowledge, we may note that, in general, we value success 
from ability over mere lucky success. Our preference for knowledge over mere true 
belief may now be understood as an instance of this more general valuing. Again: 
in cases of knowledge, true belief is no mere lucky success; rather, S’s believing 
the truth is attributable to the exercise of ability (Greco 2012: 2). 
The virtue-reliabilist’s answer to the value problems is thus as follows. True beliefs that 
result from the exercise of a subject’s competence —that is, instances of knowledge— 
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are more valuable than true beliefs that do not result from such an exercise —i.e., mere 
true beliefs or true+Gettierized beliefs— because the former are successful performances 
that are creditable to the subject while the latter are lucky outcomes. Or, to say it more 
briefly, true beliefs that result from the exercise of a subject’s competence possess an 
additional credit value that is not possessed by true or Gettierized+true beliefs that are 
luckily true. 
Besides offering a solution to the primary and the secondary value problems, virtue-
reliabilism also solves the tertiary value problem. Recall that answering the tertiary value 
problem requires explaining why knowledge possesses a different kind of value than that 
possessed by anything that falls short of knowledge. Answering the tertiary value problem 
requires explaining why the value of knowledge differs from the value of mere true or 
Gettierized+true belief, not only as matter of degree but also as a matter of kind. This is a 
challenge that the aforementioned virtue-reliabilist answer meets very well. Indeed, credit 
value—the additional value that, according to virtue-reliabilism, only knowledge possesses —
is not a value that knowledge possesses in virtue of its good effects. As virtue-reliabilists 
emphasize, credit value is not an instrumental but a final value of knowledge (recall the 
previously presented distinction). In contrast, the value possessed by mere true and 
Gettierized+true belief is merely instrumental. Mere true and Gettierized+true beliefs draw 
their value solely from their good practical effects, e.g. they help us not to eat toxic plants, they 
allow us to reach Larissa, etc. Mere true and Gettierized+true beliefs are merely instrumentally 
practically valuable. 
To recap, according to virtue-reliabilism, the value of knowledge differs from the value 
of mere true and Gettierized+true beliefs as a matter of kind because the additional value of 
knowledge is a final value while true and Gettierized+true beliefs are merely instrumentally 
valuable.10 
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The Jokester case 
Virtue-reliabilism seems to fare well with the value problems.11 Famously though, the most 
serious threat for virtue-reliabilism comes from its apparent inability to deal with cases 
involving environmental luck, cases like the Jokester: 
You see a surface that looks red in ostensibly normal conditions. But it is a 
kaleidoscope surface controlled by a jokester who also controls the ambient light, 
and might as easily have presented you with a red-light+white-surface combination 
as with the actual white-light+red-surface combination (Sosa 2007: 31). 12 
Your belief that the surface is red results from the exercise of your visual competence. But, 
even if the Jokester provides you with the good white-light+red surface combination, you 
arguably do not know that the surface is red. In such a case, you might too easily have been 
wrong, and when you might too easily have been wrong you don’t have knowledge. The risks 
that the Jokester has presented you with the bad combination are too high. So the problem for 
virtue-reliabilism is that, in cases involving environmental luck, the virtue-reliabilist’s 
conditions are satisfied while the subject does not know (Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2009a; 
Pritchard 2009b; Sosa 2007; Sosa 2015). The virtue epistemological literature contains various 
replies to this objection.13 Sosa’s answer is especially interesting; indeed, Sosa’s reply to the 
Jokester case leads to the emergence of a new value problem. Let us see why. 
Sosa’s Virtue-Reliabilism and the New Value Problem 
Sosa’s solution to the Jokester objection relies on a distinction between kinds of knowledge. 
Famously, Sosa supports this distinction between kinds of knowledge by differentiating 
between various standards along which performances can be evaluated (Sosa 2007; Sosa 2009a; 
Sosa 2009b; Sosa 2011; Sosa 2015). I briefly introduce these standards. 
Success, aptness and meta-aptness 
First, for Sosa, a performance is valuable when it is successful, when it achieves its constitutive 
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purpose. The act of prescribing medication is better when it succeeds in curing the patient than 
when it fails to do so. Second, as seen above, a successful performance is even more valuable 
when it results from the exercise of a subject’s competence than when it is due to luck. A 
successful hunter’s shot is even better when it results from the exercise of the hunter’s 
competence and is not a lucky outcome. Sosa calls a successful performance that results from 
the exercise of a subject’s competence an apt performance. Thus Sosa’s standard of aptness 
can be formulated in the following terms: 
A subject S’s successful performance P is apt when P results from the exercise by S of 
one of her competences. 
Third, a successful performance is also sometimes, according to Sosa, meta-apt. 
A shot is meta-apt iff it is well-selected: i.e., iff it takes appropriate risk, and its 
doing so manifests the agent's competence for target and shot selection (Sosa 
2009b: 12). 
For instance, a hunter’s shot is meta-apt when it is performed while the hunter truly believes 
that the risks of missing her target are not too high (Sosa 2015: 68). Paraphrasing, Sosa’s 
standard of meta-aptness entails (at least) the following: 
A subject’s performance P is meta-apt when P is accompanied by the second-order 
true14 belief that the risks of P being unsuccessful are not too high.15 
Finally, the meta-aptness of a performance should be distinguished from its environmental 
safety where: 
A subject’s successful performance P is environmentally safe when P takes place in an 
environment in which the risks of P being unsuccessful are not too high. 
Consider the case of the skillful hunter once again. Suppose that she goes hunting on a 
sunny, non-windy day and that she woke up in normal good form. The risks of missing her 
target today are not especially high. She shoots and hits her target as a result of her hunting 
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competence. Her successful performance is apt and environmentally safe. What about the meta-
aptness of the performance? As we just saw, the latter depends on whether she, furthermore, 
believes that the risks of missing her target are not too high. In order for the successful 
performance of the hunter to be meta-apt, the environment must not only be such that her 
performance could not easily have been unsuccessful, but the hunter also has to believe that the 
environment is such. Put briefly, Sosa’s standard of meta-aptness combines: 
1. A doxastic condition that requires that the subject believes, on a second-order 
level, that the environment is safe, that is, that the risks of failing are not too high; 
with  
2. A modal condition that requires that the environment really be safe. 
That meta-aptness requires the satisfaction of the second, modal, condition is made clear by 
Sosa’s repeated insistence that the second-order belief has to be apt and thus true (Sosa 2007: 
24; Sosa 2015: 69).  As for the first, doxastic, condition, the fact that it has to be fulfilled is 
made clear by Sosa’s basketball player case (Sosa 2015: 71-72). Sosa asks us to consider: 
a shooter as she approaches a distance to the basket near her relevant threshold of 
reliability….Suppose her to be above the threshold, but indiscernibly so to her. A 
statistician-coach-observer might know perfectly well that the player is now barely 
above the threshold. Suppose he has studied her success rate extensively, aided by 
a device that measures with exactitude her distance from the basket….He can tell 
that she is reliable enough at that distance…. But she herself is very far from 
knowing any such thing (Sosa 2015: 71-72). 
Sosa continues: 
The player may still attain her basic aim: namely, to sink that shot in the basket. In 
that respect her shot may… be apt… What then is she missing? Anything? … 
Unlike the statistician, she is unable to tell that her shot is still reliable enough at 
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that distance. If she shoots anyhow, and her shot turns out to be reliable enough, 
she may aptly reach her aim of scoring that goal. What she does not aptly reach, 
however, is the aim of aptly scoring (Sosa 2015: 71-72). 
The player’s shot is safe since, as the statistician observes, she shoots from a distance that is 
above her threshold of reliability. But, as Sosa puts it, something is missing. Her shot is not 
meta-apt because the basketball player is not aware that she is reliable at that distance. This is 
an example in which the performance is apt and safe but not meta-apt. Note that there are also, 
according to Sosa, meta-apt performances that are not apt: 
An archer/hunter's shot selection and risk taking may be excellent, for example, and 
in taking a certain shot he may manifest his competence at assessing risk, while the 
shot itself nevertheless fails, being unsuccessful (inaccurate) and hence inapt. The 
shot is hence meta-apt without being apt (Sosa 2009b: 12). 
So, a shot can be apt without being meta-apt, or meta-apt without being apt. Can we say 
something similar of the relationship between meta-aptness and safety? As the above basketball 
case illustrates, there are safe performances that are not meta-apt. But, given that meta-aptness 
entails safety, there are no meta-apt performances that are not safe. 
Animal, reflective and full knowledge 
The application of the standards of aptness and meta-aptness to true beliefs leads to the 
recognition of three kinds of knowledge. 
The first, low-level, kind of knowledge is the kind that a subject possesses when she 
truly believes something as a result of the exercise of her competence, that is, when she holds 
an apt belief. This first kind of knowledge is so-called animal knowledge (Sosa 2007; Sosa 
2009a; Sosa 2015). 
The second, higher-level, kind of knowledge is the kind that a subject possesses when 
she holds a second-order apt belief that the risk that her first-order belief is false is not too high. 
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Sosa calls this second kind of knowledge reflective knowledge (Sosa 2009b; Sosa 2015). 
The third, highest-level, kind of knowledge consists in having animal knowledge 
together with reflective knowledge. Sosa calls this third kind of knowledge full knowledge.16 
As the basketball case illustrates, a subject’s performance can be apt without being 
meta-apt. The same is true, according to Sosa, in the realm of knowledge. A subject can possess 
animal knowledge (apt belief) without possessing either reflective or full knowledge (meta-apt 
belief). A subject can attain a first-order true belief as a result of the exercise of one of her 
competences without possessing the second-order true—as we shall see the italicization is 
important—belief that the risks of being wrong on the first-order level are not high.  
Crucially, for Sosa, this is what happens in the Jokester case. In such a case, the subject 
has animal knowledge. What the subject lacks in the Jokester case—since there is undeniably 
something lacking that needs to be captured—is reflective and thus full knowledge. The reason 
why the subject, in the Jokester case, lacks reflective and thus full knowledge is not that she 
does not entertain any second-order belief regarding the risks of being wrong on the first-order 
level. This would, for sure, be one way of lacking reflective/full knowledge. But nothing in the 
description of the Jokester case is said regarding the presence or the absence of such a second-
order belief. Nothing allows us to say that the lack of reflective/full knowledge is due to the 
absence of such a second-order belief regarding the risks of being wrong. What is made very 
clear in the description of the Jokester case, and what explains why the subject lacks 
reflective/full knowledge, is that her first-order belief is not safe. It is the modal condition (and 
not the doxastic condition) of meta-aptness that is not fulfilled. To put it slightly differently, 
even if the subject in the Jokester case entertained the second-order belief that the risks of being 
wrong are not high, she would still lack reflective/full knowledge since this second-order belief 
would be false. 
The New Value Problem 
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Recall the virtue-reliabilist’s solution to the classical value problem: 
True beliefs that result from the exercise of a subject’s competence—that is, instances 
of knowledge—are more valuable than true beliefs that do not result from such an 
exercise—i.e., mere true beliefs or true+Gettierized beliefs—because the former are 
successful performances that are creditable to the subject while the latter are lucky 
outcomes. 
This solution explains why Sosa’s animal knowledge is better than a mere true belief or a 
Gettierized+true belief, since an instance of animal knowledge is a true belief that results from 
the exercise of a subject’s competence. An instance of animal knowledge is more valuable than 
a merely true or a Gettierized+true belief because, in the case of animal knowledge, the true 
belief is creditable to the subject. 
What about the value of full knowledge? Sosa explicitly says that the complex cognitive 
state consisting in having animal knowledge and reflective knowledge is more valuable than 
the simpler state consisting in having only animal knowledge. 
 Apt belief aptly noted, reflective knowledge, is better than mere apt belief or 
animal knowledge, especially when the reflective knowledge helps to guide the first 
order belief so that it is apt (Sosa 2009b: 15). 
Or, more generally, performances that are apt and meta-apt are, according to Sosa, better than 
mere apt performances (Sosa 2009b: 13; Sosa 2015: 68-74). But why would an apt belief that 
is also meta-apt be better than a mere apt belief? Why would full knowledge be more valuable 
than mere animal knowledge? This is what I suggest we call the new value problem. The 
following quotation gives us a clue as to how Sosa answers these questions.17 
Diana's apt shot that kills its prey is a better shot if apt than if successful only by 
luck and not through competence. Moreover, it is also a better, more admirable, 
more creditable shot, if its success flows also from her target-selecting, shot-picking 
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competences. Her shot is more creditable in that case than it is when the right 
competence is manifest in conditions required for a successful first-order 
performance, but only by luck external to any such selection meta-competence on 
her part (Sosa 2009b: 14). 
In other words, Sosa extends the aforementioned virtue-reliabilist solution to full knowledge. 
The reason why full knowledge is more valuable than mere animal knowledge is a matter of 
credit as well. When a subject fully knows, the true belief is even more creditable to the subject 
than when she possesses mere animal knowledge. And this explains why full knowledge is a 
better epistemic state than animal knowledge. To put it differently, full knowledge displays 
more credit value than animal knowledge and this is why the former is, according to Sosa, better 
than the latter. In the following section, I critically consider this solution to the new value 
problem. 
Is full knowledge more creditable? 
Is a subject S’s true belief really more creditable to S when the true belief in question is not 
only apt but also meta-apt, that is, when the subject has full knowledge? This, I believe, is 
doubtful. To show why this is so, I need, first, to introduce two new cases: Risky and Secure. 
Risky 
Rafa believes, on a second-order level, that the risks of forming a false first-order 
belief regarding the color of the surface in front of him are not too high. His second-
order belief is false. In fact, the environment is such that the risks of forming a false 
first-order belief are indeed high. Guided by this second-order belief, Rafa exercises 
his reliable visual competence and luckily—given the environment he is in—forms 
a true first-order belief that the surface is red as a result of the exercise of his visual 
competence. 
Rafa’s belief that the surface is red is neither safe nor meta-apt, given that his second-order 
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belief is false. Rafa’s belief that the surface is red is, however, apt. It is only a piece of animal 
knowledge. 
Secure 
Sara believes, on a second-order level, that the risks of forming a false first-order 
belief regarding the color of the surface in front of her are not too high. This second-
order belief is true. The environment really is such that the risks of Sara forming a 
false belief are not too high. Guided by this second-order belief, Sara exercises her 
reliable visual competence and truly believes that the surface is red as a result of 
this exercise.  
Unlike Rafa’s, Sara’s first-order true belief is not only apt but also meta-apt. It is a piece of 
reflective and full knowledge. 
Recall that my purpose in this section is to critically consider Sosa’s answer to the new 
value problem. Sosa’s answer consists in extending, to full knowledge, the virtue-reliabilist’s 
solution to the ‘classical’ value problem. Full knowledge is better than animal knowledge 
because, in the case of full knowledge, the true belief is even more creditable to the subject. 
The supposition that creditability comes in degrees is not problematic. A subject can contribute 
more or less to the occurrence of a successful performance and this makes her successful 
performance more or less creditable to her. More precisely, the attribution of creditability is, on 
my view, very probably governed by the following principle. 
The degrees of creditability principle 
A successful performance P1 is more creditable to a subject S than a successful 
performance P2 only if S has, in one way or another (for instance, by exercising 
one of her competences) contributed more to the occurrence of P1 than to the 
occurrence of P2. 
Bearing this principle in mind, let us reconsider the two cases above. Does the subject deserve 
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more credit for her first-order true belief in “Secure” than in “Risky”, as Sosa’s answer to the 
new value problem forces him to say? It does not seem so. The contribution of a subject to the 
possession of a true belief is not higher when she —like Sara in “Secure”— has formed a true 
second-order belief about the risk of forming a false first-order belief than when she —like Rafa 
in “Risky”— has formed a false second-order belief about this risk. Indeed, we can assume that 
Sara in “Secure” does not do anything to increase her chances of forming a true belief that Rafa 
does not do in “Risky”. Sara and Rafa both take time to assess the risks of being wrong, take 
these risks to be acceptable, and exercise their visual competence. They are exactly on a par as 
regards their contribution to the adoption of a true belief, and thus—given the principle above—
exactly on a par as regards their creditability. 
Contrary to what Sosa’s answer to the new value problem claims, Sara does not deserve 
more credit than Rafa for her true belief. And, once again, this is because Sara does not 
contribute more in coming to possess a true belief than Rafa. They are on the par as far as their 
respective endeavours to obtain a true belief are concerned. Both Sara and Rafa try as much as 
they can to tell whether the circumstances are safe. The only difference is that Rafa is, despite 
his best efforts, unfortunately wrong about them. This unfortunate fact of the matter does not, 
however, make Sara more creditable than Rafa for her true belief. 
Conclusion 
To recap, the recognition of higher forms of knowledge—reflective and full knowledgeoffers a 
way of capturing what is going wrong for the subject in the Jokester case. In such a case, the 
subject has animal knowledge but lacks reflective and, thus, full knowledge. The subject’s 
belief is apt but it is not meta-apt. As I have emphasized, the reason why it is only apt is not 
that the doxastic condition of meta-aptness is violated. In the Jokester case, we simply do not 
know whether the subject possesses a doxastic attitude regarding the risks of believing 
something falsely on the first-order level. The reason why the subject’s belief is only apt is that 
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the modal condition of meta-aptness is violated. The belief is not environmentally safe. This, 
as just said, explains why the cognitive situation of the subject in the Jokester case seems to be 
lacking. His cognitive situation is not ideal because the subject does not have reflective or full 
knowledge. He possesses only animal knowledge. Most importantly for my purpose here, such 
an explanation presupposes that possessing full knowledge is somehow better than possessing 
animal knowledge. But why would full knowledge be better than mere animal knowledge? It is 
at this point that the new value problem makes its appearance. The upshot of this contribution 
is that the virtue-reliabilist’s solution to the ‘classical’ value problem cannot be extended to 
solve this new problem. The superiority of full knowledge over animal knowledge cannot be 
captured in terms of credit. As I have argued, the subject does not deserve more credit for her 
first-order true belief when she has full knowledge. Sara’s first-order true belief in “Secure” is 
not more creditable to her than Rafa’s belief in “Risky”. 
1 Some have doubted whether knowledge that p is a better cognitive state than true belief that 
p. See e.g. Dutant 2012.  
2 See Olsson 2007, Olsson 2011 for the view that knowledge, understood as reliable true belief, 
is in fact practically more valuable than any subset of its parts. 
3 The reason why knowledge cannot be situated on the same evaluative continuum as a mere 
true belief and a Gettierized+true belief is, according to Pritchard (2009a: 4), that it would fail 
“to explain why the long history of epistemological discussion has focused specifically on the 
stage in this continuum of epistemic value that knowledge marks rather than some other stage 
(such as a stage just before the one marked out by knowledge, or just after).” 
4 This is not the only possible solution. Rather than relying on the distinction between 
instrumental and final value, another way of solving the tertiary value problem is to make use 
of the distinction between various spectra of evaluation. Consider a pluralist about values who 
thinks that there are at least three spectra of evaluation that apply to beliefs: the epistemic 
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spectrum (that brings the various epistemic values together), the practical spectrum (that gathers 
the different practical values), and the moral spectrum. Now, suppose the pluralist in question 
manages to show that knowledge possesses some moral value—whether final or instrumental—
that the states that fall short of knowledge do not, in contrast, possess. This amounts to 
establishing that knowledge is characterized by a different kind of value. This is another way 
of solving the tertiary value problem. 
5 The reverse is also true. One cannot solve the value problems without, thereby, imposing an 
answer on the analysis of knowledge. Usually, however, epistemologists address the problem 
of analysis first. They then try to find an explanation of the superior value of knowledge that is 
compatible with their analysis. 
6 For interesting replies on behalf of reliabilists, see e.g. Goldman and Olsson 2009; Olsson 
2007, Olsson 2011. 
7 Virtue-reliabilism is to be distinguished from virtue-responsibilism according to which virtues 
are not reliable competences like memory or vision but acquired character-traits. See Battaly 
2008; Greco and Reibsamen forthcoming. Sosa casts doubt on the distinction between virtue-
reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism in Sosa 2015 (chapter 2). 
8 According to Sosa, performances are characterized by constitutive aims. See Sosa 2015: 65; 
Sosa 2015: 88, note 5. 
9 Still another way of saying the same thing is in terms “achievement”. Successful performances 
that result from the exercise of a competence are achievements and achievements are better than 
successful performances that are due to luck. Pritchard (2009b: 409) suggests this formulation. 
It is now very common; see Greco (2010); Greco and Reibsamen forthcoming: 9. 
10 Note that even if virtue-reliabilists thought that mere true belief was in some sense finally 
valuable, they could still try to respond to the tertiary value problem as follows. They could 
contend that although mere true belief and knowledge are both finally valuable, the final value 
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that characterizes knowledge is credit value and thus belongs to a different kind of final value 
than the kind of final value characterizing true beliefs. 
11 The virtue-reliabilist’s answer to the value problems is not, however, free from difficulties. 
See  Kelp and Simion forthcoming; Meylan 2013.  
12 Sosa’s Jokester case is analogous to Goldman’s famous “Barns case” initially presented in 
Goldman 1976. 
13 See Greco’s pragmatic attribution theory (Greco 2012; Greco and Reibsamen forthcoming) 
and Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology (Pritchard forthcoming). Only Sosa’s solution to 
the Jokester case appeals to the differentiation of various levels of knowledge and, thereby, 
leads to the emergence of what I call the new value problem.  
14 Sosa often emphasizes that the second-order belief that regards the risks must itself be apt, 
that is, true in order for the first-order performance to be meta-apt (Sosa 2007: 24; Sosa 2015: 
69). 
15 In addition to aptness and meta-aptness, Sosa distinguishes a third normative standard that 
applies to performances: full aptness. As aptness is the standard of animal knowledge, meta-
aptness the standard of reflective knowledge, full aptness is the normative standard satisfied by 
full knowledge. A performance P is fully apt if and only if “it is guided to aptness through the 
agent’s reflectively apt risk assessment.” (Sosa 2015: 9) Thus, full aptness consists in a specific 
combination of aptness and meta-aptness that occurs —to say it briefly— when a performance 
is apt because it is meta-apt. For sake of simplicity, I shall leave full aptness aside in this 
contribution. 
16 More precisely, a subject S fully knows, according to Sosa, when S’s animal knowledge 
results from S having aptly assessed the risk of being wrong, that is, from S having reflective 
knowledge. Her animal knowledge, in some sense, has to be due to her reflective knowledge. 
See Sosa 2015: 66-74. 
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17 See also e.g. Sosa 2009b: 14 ; Sosa 2015: 85. 
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